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Centripetal Forces: Multidistrict Litigation and Its 
Parts 
Catherine R. Borden, Emery G. Lee III, and Margaret S. Williams* 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost by definition, multidistrict litigation is complex. One 
consequence of this complexity is that multidistrict litigation may 
be viewed from a variety of perspectives. First, multidistrict 
litigation may be viewed from the perspective of its share of 
overall civil litigation in the federal courts. Commentators 
sometimes stress that a relatively large percentage of all civil 
litigation takes place within multidistrict aggregations,1 a point that 
is also sometimes made in official court reports.2 Multidistrict 
litigation may also be viewed at the level of centralized 
proceedings and thus understood at the level of what one might term 
“individual aggregations.” Such a perspective lends itself to a 
discussion of global settlements and the practical and ethical issues 
involved in negotiating and reviewing such.3 Relatedly, multidistrict 
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 * The authors are researchers at the Federal Judicial Center. Affiliation is 
provided for identification only. The views expressed in this Article are those of 
the authors and not those of the Federal Judicial Center or any other judicial-
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colleagues, including Joe Cecil and Dan Holt, as well as the comments of 
participants in the Symposium, especially Francis McGovern. 
 1. See, e.g., John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and 
Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIGATION 26, 26 (2012) (estimating that 
MDL cases account for more than 15% of all civil litigation in the federal 
courts); Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 
LA. L. REV. 371, 373 (2014) (same).  
 2. Fluctuations in the number of new MDL cases are often evident in the 
courts’ overall statistics. In 2012, for example, the courts reported that civil 
filings based on diversity of citizenship declined by 15%, “primarily because of 
a 60 percent decline in filings of multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases related to 
asbestos (down by 22,561 cases).” See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2012, “U.S. DISTRICT COURTS,” available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-district-courts.aspx, 
archived at http://perma .cc/7CCM-TYBB (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).  
 3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], Unsettling Efficiency: When 
Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. 
L. REV. 157, 195–96 (2004) [hereinafter Burch, Unsettling Efficiency] (“[T]he 
practical consequence of transfer translates into a non-opt out class action for 
pretrial purposes and produces settlement as would class certification. . . . 
Consequently, efficiency through procedural devices, without the balance of 
fairness, does not necessarily correlate into just outcomes.”). 
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litigation may be viewed from the perspective of the “repeat 
player” attorneys who often play a decisive role in the shape and 
ultimate outcome of proceedings.4  
A less common frame, perhaps, is that of the constituent civil 
actions which together comprise the proceedings proposed for 
centralization. From the perspective of a centralized proceeding or 
of a repeat player with a large inventory of claims, these 
constituent civil actions—referred to as “MDL cases”—may seem 
relatively unimportant. Unless an MDL case is selected as a 
potential bellwether trial case,5 for example, little individualized 
discovery or activity may actually take place. And yet, the sheer 
volume of MDL cases suggests that scholars and policymakers 
should not focus exclusively on the other levels of analysis. There 
is certainly room for increasing our understanding of these 
essential parts of MDL proceedings.  
Scholars and policymakers have a reasonably adequate 
understanding of what happens to cases resolved by a transferee 
court in a centralized MDL proceeding. But there are two 
categories of MDL cases that are not resolved in an MDL 
transferee court: cases that are part of a motion to transfer before 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that is not granted, 
and the section 1407 remand cases, which are centralized but then 
remanded to the transferor court at the conclusion of common 
pretrial matters in the aggregate proceeding. In the terms used by 
the organizers of this Symposium, these cases are decidedly 
disaggregated. With respect to the first category, the MDL cases 
are aggregated in a motion and, possibly, in the Panel’s 
deliberations but then not formally aggregated. With respect to the 
second category, the MDL cases are formally aggregated in the 
centralized proceeding but then broken back into separate civil 
actions. It is safe to say that much less is known, in general, about 
these two groups of cases at the margins of the MDL process. 
                                                                                                             
 4. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in 
Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing role and 
incentives of repeat players); Margaret S. Williams et al., Repeat Players in 
Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141 (2012) (using social network 
analysis to identify and map the network of repeat plaintiff attorneys in MDL 
proceedings); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (mapping repeat players’ appointments to 
leadership positions in centralized proceedings).  
 5. A bellwether trial (sometimes called a “test” trial) is a trial of a 
representative case in an MDL proceeding intended “to provide meaningful 
information and experience to everyone involved in the litigation.” Eldon E. 
Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 
2332 (2008). 
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Using a variety of data sources, this Article systematically 
examines the universe of MDL cases—centralized and non-
centralized—with a special emphasis on these two groups of 
disaggregated cases. Part I provides a brief overview of the MDL 
process. Part II then provides a systematic analysis of the 
centralization of MDL cases, with a special focus in Part III on 
cases that are non-centralized. Somewhat surprisingly, many non-
centralized cases do eventually end up transferred to another 
district, either to another MDL proceeding or to another federal 
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Part IV provides an analysis of 
the termination of centralized MDL cases—most of which 
terminate in the transferee court—and Part V documents what 
happens to section 1407 remand cases when they return to the 
transferor court. We find that few section 1407 remand cases are 
actually tried post-remand; most settle. 
I. THE MDL PROCESS  
In this Article, the term “MDL cases” is used to describe all 
cases that come before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (the Panel), regardless of whether they are ever 
transferred and made part of an MDL proceeding. MDL cases are 
handled by the Panel under the authority granted by the 
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968.6 The Panel may centralize 
“civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact” 
before a single district judge “for coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings” when doing so will promote “the 
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and 
efficient conduct of such actions.”7  
The first cases that become MDL cases are those subject to a 
motion to transfer,8 in which a party requests that a group of cases 
be centralized before a single district judge, called the transferee 
judge. If the Panel grants the motion, it issues a Transfer Order. 
Centralized MDL cases—including non-transferred cases already 
in the transferee district—become part of an MDL proceeding in 
the transferee court. If the Panel denies centralization by issuing an 
Order Denying Transfer, the cases remain in the district courts in 
                                                                                                             
 6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 7. Id. § 1407(a).  
 8. In the early days of the Panel, show-cause orders played a major role, 
but they are no longer very common. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Rule 8.1, 277 F.R.D. 480 (2011) [hereinafter 
Panel Rules].  
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which they were initially filed or removed to. Non-centralized 
cases are discussed in detail below.9 
The centralization decision does not end the Panel’s work. 
Cases continue to come before the Panel as potential tag-alongs. 
Tag-along cases involve common questions of fact with already 
centralized cases or cases subject to a pending centralization 
motion.10 Potential tag-alongs in other districts are usually brought 
to the Panel’s attention by attorneys in centralized proceedings or 
by parties in the potential tag-alongs. If the common questions of 
fact are apparent, the Panel’s clerk issues a Conditional Transfer 
Order (CTO). The CTO becomes final, and the cases are 
transferred, after seven days if no party objects.11 When tag-along 
status is disputed, the Panel will issue an order granting or denying 
transfer. Some tag-along cases are already before the Panel while it 
is considering centralization. Between the filing of the motion and 
the Panel’s centralization decision, a number of potential tag-along 
cases may already have been added to the docket. The Panel is 
aware of the cases and may refer to them in its centralization 
decision—the number of potential tag-alongs can inform the 
Panel’s decision for or against centralization.12 But these early 
potential tag-alongs are not typically governed by the order 
granting or denying centralization. If centralization is granted, 
these cases will typically be included in the first CTO.  
The Panel plays no role in adjudicating the merits of MDL 
cases, regardless of whether the cases are centralized.13 The 
                                                                                                             
 9. See infra at notes 29–75 and accompanying text.  
 10. It should be noted that, in this paper, we define tag-alongs slightly 
differently than the Panel does. “‘Tag-along action’ refers to a civil action 
pending in a district court which involves common questions of fact with either 
(1) actions on a pending motion to transfer to create an MDL or (2) actions 
previously transferred to an existing MDL, and which the Panel would consider 
transferring under Section 1407.” Panel Rules, supra note 8, at Rule 1.1(h). 
Because “[p]otential tag-along actions filed in the transferee district do not 
require Panel action,” they are not technically considered tag-alongs and are 
consolidated or coordinated using the transferee court’s procedures for intra-
district reassignment of cases. Id. at Rule 7.2(a). In this Article, we use the term 
“tag-along” to mean all cases centralized after the original transfer motion is 
decided, whether or not they originate in the transferee district. 
 11. See id. at Rule 7.1(b), (c).  
 12. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab. Litig., 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (ordering transfer of a single action to join one 
other action pending in district where eight tag-along actions expected). 
 13. In the words of a former Panel chairman: 
Bear in mind that we don’t become involved, at all, in the merits of the 
claims or disputes in multidistrict litigation. We really are gatekeepers, 
deciding whether certain litigation should be let through the gates, so to 
speak, and, if so, where it should go. After that, it’s entirely within the 
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transferee court has the same authority with respect to pretrial 
proceedings as it would in any other case.14 Centralized cases are 
either disposed of in the transferee court (by termination of the 
case, remand to state court, transfer to another district, etc.), or 
remanded to their transferor courts. The Panel retains the authority 
to remand centralized cases back to their transferor courts. The 
MDL Act requires remand “at or before the conclusion of such 
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred 
unless it shall have been previously terminated.”15  
Although remand is required if all pretrial matters are 
concluded, the transferee court need not wait until that point. 
Centralization is intended to “promote the just and efficient 
conduct”16 of the centralized cases, not to ensure that no pretrial 
matters remain for the transferor court. In determining when to 
suggest remand, the guiding principle is whether common issues 
have been resolved and only individual issues remain. As a guide 
for judges states, “[r]emand is not appropriate if there is more to be 
done on the cases as a group. But remand may be appropriate if the 
remaining proceedings relate to individual cases and issues rather 
than to the entire docket or to groups of cases.”17 The transferee 
court or any party may file a suggestion of remand before the 
Panel.18 In practice, the Panel generally remands cases only when 
the transferee court has filed a suggestion of remand.19 Later 
                                                                                                             
 
prerogative of the transferee judge to manage the litigation and make 
all procedural and substantive rulings the case might require in a 
pretrial context.  
Chair of Judicial Panel Sees Role as Gatekeeper, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 2.  
 14. “During the pendency of the MDL, [the transferee judge] may exercise all 
the powers available to a federal judge in any other case.” BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN 
& CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR TRANSFEREE 
JUDGES 3 (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/MDLG 
dePL.pdf/$file/MDLGdePL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/44GC-AV4V.  
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). The Supreme Court has ruled that a 
transferee court may not transfer cases to itself under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 for 
purposes of conducting a trial after pretrial matters have been resolved. See 
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27 
(1998). 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 17. ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, supra note 14, at 48. 
 18. Panel Rules, supra note 8, at Rule 10.1(b). 
 19. “Consideration of remand may be initiated by any of three means: 
motion of any party, suggestion of the transferee court, or on the Panel’s own 
initiative. Of these, suggestion of remand by the transferee court is both the most 
common and the most likely to result in remand being ordered.” DAVID HERR, 
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sections explore the commonality of remand, but first we turn to 
aggregate litigation to provide a comparison.  
II. MDL CASES CENTRALIZED AND NON-CENTRALIZED 
Simply put, there are a lot of MDL cases. The Panel Cases 
Database contains information on 463,795 cases that have appeared on 
the Panel’s docket.20 Products liability cases heavily dominate this 
database, accounting for 93% of the cases. Securities is the next largest 
case category, making up just 1.4% of the database. Only 20% of all 
MDL proceedings involve products liability claims, but the 
overwhelming majority of cases that are considered by the Panel 
involve such claims. The Panel Cases Database is, in fact, dominated 
by a few mammoth products liability proceedings. The largest, not 
surprisingly, is MDL No. 875, In re Asbestos Products Liability 
Litigation (No. VI), which accounts for 200,265 cases, or 43% of the 
database. MDL No. 875 and the ten next largest products liability 
proceedings account for 71% of the database.21 All the non-products 
                                                                                                             
 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 10:6 (2014) (footnote omitted). See also 
Panel Rules, supra note 8, at Rule 10.1(b) (“Typically, the transferee judge 
recommends remand of an action, or a part of it, to the transferor court at any 
time by filing a suggestion of remand with the Panel.”) 
 20. The Panel Cases Database was created for this project using MDL case 
records collected by the JPML clerk’s office. These data are used by the JPML, 
for example, in compiling its annual reports. See, e.g., Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litig., Calendar Year Statistics of the United States Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation, January through December 2013, available at 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics- 
2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/89DN-2YP6. The records appear to be 
complete for cases docketed after the Panel’s automation in 1992; prior to 1992, 
the records are limited to a few specific proceedings, including MDL 875 
(initiated in 1991). Less than 1% of the cases have a disposition date prior to 
1991. Inclusion of that small number of cases is unlikely to affect our findings. 
For more information on the data used, see infra Technical Appendix.  
 21. These proceedings are, in order of size: In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992); In re Diet 
Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 
No. 1203, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121169 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2010); In re 
Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2005); In re 
Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., 
MDL No. 2100, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95475 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011); In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2007 WL 2406850 (E.D. La. Aug. 
20, 2007); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1507, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50748 (J.P.M.L. May 17, 2010); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., Pelvic 
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2325, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71479 
(J.P.M.L. May 22, 2012); In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. 
Litig., MDL No. 2327, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179053 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 20, 
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liability cases account for just 7%. There are almost as many cases in 
MDL No. 926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability 
Litigation) in the database as there are cases from all other non-product 
liability types of proceedings (air disaster, antitrust, and so on) 
combined. 
How does the Panel dispose of the individual cases on its docket? 
How many of those cases actually become part of a centralized MDL 
proceeding through transfer or related means? A case becomes part of 
a centralized MDL proceeding—identified in this Article as a 
“centralized MDL case” whether or not transferred—when it is 
disposed of in one of four ways by the Panel. These are identified in 
the database by the following codes: Transfer; CTO Final; NTN; and 
TR’E Severed.  
(1) Transfer. A case may be transferred to a transferee court by a 
Transfer Order. A Transfer Order is typically the centralization 
decision, but a decision on a disputed potential tag-along may also be 
termed a Transfer Order. 
(2) CTO Final. A case may be transferred to a transferee court 
subsequent to a Transfer Order in a Conditional Transfer Order. The 
CTO is “conditional” for seven days; at the expiration of that time, 
absent any objection, the CTO is made final and the case is transferred 
to a proceeding. These are tag-along cases, discussed above.22 
(3) NTN. A case may be made part of an MDL proceeding in the 
district in which it was originally filed, and thus without transfer. 
These cases are called “NTN” cases in Panel argot—i.e., “No Transfer 
Necessary” cases. NTN cases are considered “centralized” for 
purposes of this Article. They may be either cases included in an 
original motion to transfer or cases filed later in the transferee district. 
(4) TR’E Severed. Cases may be created within an existing MDL 
proceeding through a procedure known as “Transferee Severed.” This 
procedure splits an already centralized case into separate actions; in a 
sense, it is “reverse joinder,” in that multiple parties joined in a single 
case are severed into multiple cases for purposes of the proceeding.23  
                                                                                                             
 
2013); In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197 (D. Minn. 2003); In re 
Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1769, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124798 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2009). 
 22. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 23. This procedure has only been used since 2004, and the nearly 100,000 
cases are found in only 20 proceedings. These are obviously large proceedings, for 
the most part, including Asbestos, Diet Drugs, Prempro, Welding Fumes, Vioxx, 
and Seroquel proceedings as well as the following: In re Phenylpropanolamine 
(PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 69 Pa. D. & C.4th 320 (Pa. C. P. 2003); In re 
Silica Products Liability Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005); In re 
Ortho Evra Products Liability Litigation, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2006); 
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Together, these four disposition codes, representing different 
avenues of centralization, account for 96% of the cases before the 
Panel. In other words, a relatively small number of cases on the 
Panel’s docket are not centralized—and many, if not most, of those are 
not centralized because the case terminated in the potential transferor 
district court prior to final action by the Panel.24 The denial of a 
motion to transfer accounts for just 0.7% of all case dispositions in the 
Panel Cases Database.  
The most common disposition was CTO Final, which accounts for 
180,904 cases, or 42% of all case dispositions. In short, tag-along 
cases are a common feature of multidistrict litigation. NTN cases 
represent the next largest category of dispositions, with 104,752 
cases—25% of all dispositions. Next are the transferee-severed cases, 
which account for 99,799 cases (23%), and then the transfers, which 
amount to 22,433 cases (5%). A large number of MDL cases, nearly 
half, are centralized but not transferred because they were originally 
filed in the transferee court (NTN cases) or have been created as new 
cases in the transferee court (Transferee Severed cases).  
One additional point should be made with respect to NTN cases. 
In some MDL proceedings, the parties agree to—and the judge issues 
an order allowing—direct filing. In direct filing, new plaintiffs may 
file actions in the transferee district, even if venue is not proper.25 
Provision may be made for eventual transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 
                                                                                                             
 
In re Aredia & Zometa Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1760, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43433 (M.D. Tenn. May 13, 2008). 
 24. Why are we confident enough to state that most of these cases terminate 
in the potential transferor court prior to a Panel disposition? Of the Panel 
dispositions that do not result in a case becoming part of an MDL proceeding—
about 4% of all dispositions—the most common code is “No Action Taken,” 
which accounts for 2% of all dispositions (or half of all dispositions in cases that 
do not become part of an MDL proceeding). These cases are likely terminated in 
the potential transferor court prior to Panel action—thus no action is required by 
the Panel. Similarly, the CTO may be vacated if the case terminates in the 
potential transferor district during the seven-day stay; these dispositions account 
for 1.5% of all dispositions. Other codes that appear infrequently in the database 
are “SCO Vacated” (i.e., Show Cause Order Vacated), “Motion Moot,” and 
“Motion Withdrawn.” The denial of the motion to transfer a proceeding 
accounts for just 0.7% of all case dispositions.  
 25. See, e.g., Court Management Order, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Products 
Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2012) available at http://www 
.lawd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/UPLOADS/11-md-2299.2012APR09.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/CY28-MDEM?type=pdf; Case Management Order 
No. 7, In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2:13-md-2436 (June 17, 2013) available at https://www.paed 
.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL2436/CMO7.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/CCX9-8XQ3?type=pdf.  
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1404(a) to an identified district for trial.26 When direct filing is 
permitted, a large number of NTNs may not indicate that the 
controversy is largely local.  
The disposition codes for asbestos, non-asbestos products liability, 
and all other cases are summarized in Figure 1. For asbestos cases (the 
first column, representing 166,697 total cases), CTO Final (46%) is the 
most common disposition, and Transferee Severed (41%) is the 
second most common. Transferee Severed cases are much more 
common in the asbestos MDL proceeding than in either non-asbestos 
products liability or in non-products liability—in the latter category, 
the procedure has been used in just two cases (rounds to 0% in the 
figure). In the asbestos cases, NTN and Transfer dispositions account 
for 6% and 4% of asbestos cases, respectively. Together, these four 
dispositions comprise 97% of all asbestos case dispositions for the 
period 1992–2013.27 Non-centralized cases account for just 3% of 
asbestos products liability Panel dispositions.  
FIGURE 1: PANEL CASE DISPOSITIONS, 1992–2013 
 
For non-asbestos products liability cases (second column, 
227,919 cases), the most common disposition code, again, was 
                                                                                                             
 26. See ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, supra note 14, at 30. 
 27. This analysis excludes the large number of asbestos cases transferred in 
the initial order in 1991; if those cases were included, transfer becomes a much 
more common disposition for asbestos cases. We have excluded 1991 because 
the database is probably not complete for that year. See supra note 20.  
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CTO Final—42%. The NTN disposition, 37%, is the second most 
common, and is much more common in non-asbestos products 
liability cases than in asbestos cases. Together, these codes account 
for 79% of the non-asbestos products liability cases. Transferee 
Severed cases account for 14% of the non-asbestos products 
liability cases, and Transfer accounts for 4%. Altogether, 96% of 
the non-asbestos products liability cases included in the analysis 
became part of an MDL proceeding, comparable to the figure for 
the asbestos cases. Only 4% of the non-asbestos products liability 
cases are not centralized.  
The non-products liability cases (third column, 32,224 cases) 
show a very different pattern than the asbestos and non-asbestos 
products liability cases. Most important, a much higher percentage 
of non-products liability cases are not centralized—20%, compared 
to 3–4% in the other categories. And within the centralization 
categories, the disposition codes also differ from the other 
columns. The CTO Final rate is much lower for non-products 
liability cases, just 29%, and Transfer is a much more common 
disposition, accounting for 18% of such cases. There are also a 
substantial number, 33%, of NTN cases. These findings indicate 
that, in non-products liability cases, there are fewer tag-along cases 
(the CTO Final cases), and relatively more cases are centralized in 
the initial Transfer Order.  
It is worth noting that, for each column in Figure 1, the 
Transfer and CTO Final categories amount to approximately 50%. 
But there are far more tag-alongs (CTO Final cases) in the 
products liability categories, in both percentage and in absolute 
numbers.  
III. SPOTLIGHT ON NON-CENTRALIZED CASES 
In keeping with the Symposium’s theme of disaggregation, this 
Article focuses in part on those cases that were potentially part of 
an aggregate MDL proceeding but were not centralized. These are 
cases that were included in a motion before the Panel but that the 
Panel did not centralize.28 In some cases, the Panel did not actually 
rule on the motion’s merits, either because the motion was 
withdrawn or mooted by a motion case’s resolution in the potential 
transferor district. After all, if the motion contains cases from only 
two districts, and the case(s) in one district conclude(s), then the 
                                                                                                             
 28. This includes a small number of cases that were part of a show-cause 
order instead of a motion. For purposes of this section, “motion” includes show-
cause orders. Moreover, as discussed infra, some of these cases were ultimately 
centralized in a separate motion.  
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motion loses its multidistrict character and the Panel need not 
decide on centralization. For this portion of the paper, cases 
brought before the Panel from 2000 through 2013 were examined. 
Cases where no action was taken by the Panel, typically because 
the case terminated before the Panel could act on it, have been 
removed. Of the nearly 3,400 non-centralized cases in the 2000–
2013 database,29 62% were denials, with the remainder almost 
evenly divided between withdrawn and mooted motions.  
FIGURE 2: NON-CENTRALIZED CASES, BY TYPE (N=3,386) 
 
Figure 2 shows the non-centralized cases, by type, during the 
2000–2013 timeframe. Interestingly, products liability cases are 
still the most common types of cases (26%), although they are not 
as common among the non-centralized cases as they are in the 
overall universe of MDL cases—recall that in the Panel Cases 
Database, they account for 93% of all cases. This also shows that 
some transfer motions involving products liability claims do not 
present sufficient common fact issues to merit centralization. More 
individualized fact questions may predominate in certain kinds of 
cases. One recent—if somewhat gruesome—example of this was 
in MDL No. 2079, In re Table Saw Products Liability Litigation. 
Forty-two plaintiffs in several districts moved for centralization on 
the theory that the table saws shared a common defect, i.e., the 
                                                                                                             
 29. See Technical Appendix, infra.  
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“lack [of] ‘flesh detection’ technology.”30 The Panel denied the 
motion, concluding that any “common issues . . . are overshadowed 
by the non-common ones. Each action arises from an individual 
accident that occurred under necessarily unique circumstances.”31  
The second largest category of non-centralized cases is the 
catch-all “miscellaneous” category at 20%.32 Other than securities 
(16%), no other category accounts for more than 10% of the non-
centralized cases. In short, the non-centralized cases come in all 
types, with relatively less common types of litigation (Common 
Disaster, Air Disaster) represented by fewer cases.  
FIGURE 3: DISPOSITIONS FOR NON-CENTRALIZED AND GENERAL 
CIVIL CASES (N=2,978,781), 2000–2013 
 
                                                                                                             
 30. In re Table Saw Prods. Liab. Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1384, 1384 
(J.P.M.L. 2009).  
 31. Id.  
 32. Miscellaneous proceedings are those that do not fit within any of the 
existing categories (e.g., securities, antitrust, products liability). Examples 
include In re McDonald’s Corp. Promotional Games Litigation, 192 F. Supp. 2d 
1381 (J.P.M.L. 2002); In re InPhonic, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (J.P.M.L. 
2006); and In re Long-Distance Telephone Service Federal Excise Tax Refund 
Litigation, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (J.P.M.L. 2006). 
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Figure 3 shows how non-centralized MDL cases (3,366 cases) 
terminated in their original district courts, set against general civil 
cases (2,978,781 cases) for the same time period—2000 through 
2013.33 (The termination of centralized cases is discussed 
separately in the next section.) The non-centralized MDL cases, 
interestingly, are much more likely to terminate by transfer to 
another district, either through a section 1404(a)34 transfer or an 
MDL transfer in a different proceeding (section 1407 transfer) than 
civil cases in general. Eleven percent of non-centralized MDL 
cases are transferred to another district under section 1404(a), as 
compared to 4% of civil cases in general. Of course, section 
1404(a) transfers are a viable alternative to MDL transfers, 
especially in litigation involving a relatively small number of 
cases. The Panel has held that “[w]here there are only a limited 
number of actions and the involved parties are amenable to Section 
1404 transfer, such transfer is generally preferable to centralization 
under Section 1407.”35 One potential advantage of section 1404(a) 
transfer as opposed to section 1407 transfer is that under the 
former, transfer is “not . . . for pretrial purposes only.”36  
Similarly, 9% of non-centralized MDL cases are ultimately 
made part of another MDL proceeding.37 Overall, 2% of civil cases 
terminate in the transferor court by MDL transfer, which is, in 
itself, an interesting figure. Although this finding that 9% of cases 
in denied motions terminate by MDL transfer initially looks like 
some error in the underlying data, there are clearly situations in 
which this occurs. In some circumstances, the Panel may consider 
both an industry-wide centralization and defendant-specific 
                                                                                                             
 33. The analysis in this section is limited to MDL cases filed during or after 
2000, and thus is narrower than the preceding discussion of the Panel Cases 
Database.  
 34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action 
to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”).  
 35. In re Gaiam, Inc., Water Bottle Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1374–75 (J.P.M.L. 2010). See also In re Best Buy 
Co., Inc., Cal. Song-Beverly Credit Card Act Litig., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 
(J.P.M.L. 2011) (“Seeking transfer under Section 1404(a) or seeking to dismiss 
or stay duplicative actions under the first-to-file doctrine are among the variety 
of options available to avoid duplication of efforts.”); In re Republic W. Ins. Co. 
Ins. Coverage Litig., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2002) (“There is a 
reasonable prospect that the multidistrict character of the actions here before us 
may be eliminated by district court action on motions presently pending . . . for 
transfer of venue . . . .”).  
 36. In re Republic, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.  
 37. A bit of a technical point: Obviously, our unit of analysis is not “the 
case,” but “the case-in-a-motion,” as the same case can be part of more than one 
motion to centralize.  
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centralizations as options. Consider, for example, MDL No. 1456, In 
re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 
which was centralized by the Panel in 2002.38 Four defendant 
pharmaceutical companies moved for centralization in four separate 
motions.39 The Panel considered centralization on “a company-by-
company basis”40 but determined that such a strategy would 
potentially create “an unwieldy situation.”41 Instead, it denied three 
of the four motions and transferred the cases in all four motions to 
the District of Massachusetts for pretrial proceedings.42  
In other instances, attorneys seeking centralization can succeed 
in achieving centralization with a “second bite” at the apple. In the 
Lipitor litigation, for example, the Panel initially denied a first 
motion to transfer, which was filed by the plaintiffs in three cases in 
the District of South Carolina.43 In addition to the three actions in 
the movants’ district, the Panel’s order indicated that there were 23 
additional related federal cases.44 The Panel’s August 2013 order 
stated that “[a]ll responding plaintiffs support centralization,”45 but 
that “[c]ommon defendant Pfizer Inc. strenuously opposes 
centralization.”46 The Panel’s order explained the denial in the 
following manner: 
Upon a cursory review, one might think these cases 
represent a clear candidate for centralization. The subject 
actions do share factual issues arising from allegations that 
taking Pfizer’s cholesterol drug can result in the 
development of type 2 diabetes, and that Pfizer failed 
adequately to warn consumers of this problem. The number 
of actions pending in this litigation might, in other 
circumstances, be sufficient to justify centralization. 
However, other factors weigh against centralization here. In 
                                                                                                             
 38. See In re Immunex Corp. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 201 F. Supp. 
2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2002).  
 39. The four motions were MDL No. 1453, In re Immunex Corp. Average 
Wholesale Price Litigation; MDL No. 1454, In re Pharmacia Corp. Average 
Wholesale Price Litigation; MDL No. 1455, In re Glaxosmithkline Corp. 
Average Wholesale Price Litigation; and MDL No. 1456, In re Baxter 
International, Inc. Average Wholesale Price Litigation. See id. at 1378. The last 
of these motions was restyled as In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average 
Wholesale Price Litigation. See id. at 1381−82.  
 40. Id. at 1380.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 1381.  
 43. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2013).  
 44. Id. at 1375 n.1.  
 45. Id. at 1375. 
 46. Id. at 1376.  
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particular, almost half of the actions currently comprising 
this litigation are pending in a single district—the District 
of South Carolina, and many of the actions involve 
common plaintiffs’ counsel. The South Carolina actions 
already are proceeding in a coordinated fashion before one 
judge, and, importantly, Pfizer represents in its brief that it 
is “ready and willing to work with Plaintiffs’ counsel in the 
[non-South Carolina] actions to appropriately coordinate 
any common discovery or other pretrial matters across the 
cases.” Given that express representation, the limited 
number of involved actions, and the overlap among 
counsel, we do not believe that creation of an MDL is 
necessary at this time.47  
The Panel concluded that, although the number of actions 
involved in the litigation was large enough to justify centralization 
in some circumstances, in the Lipitor litigation there was sufficient 
“overlap among counsel”48 that centralization was not warranted. In 
effect, common plaintiffs’ counsel and a “ready and willing”49 
common defendant would be able to coordinate pretrial proceedings 
outside of the formalities of an MDL proceeding.  
In a second order filed in February 2014, however, the Panel 
ordered centralization of the Lipitor litigation.50 The number of 
related actions had increased from 26 to 56,51 with an additional 170 
potential tag-alongs; actions were pending in 40 districts and before 
more than 100 judges.52 The Panel also pointed to an apparent 
decrease in the overlapping of counsel in the related actions: “the 
number of involved plaintiffs’ firms has grown as well. In our 
judgment, the increased presence of apparently unique counsel, 
coupled with the increased number of involved actions, districts, and 
judges, makes it highly difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate this 
litigation effectively on an informal basis.”53  
Another example of a successful “second bite” at the apple 
regarding centralization is the Plavix litigation. In December 2011, 
the Panel denied a motion to transfer filed by the defendant 
pharmaceutical companies.54 The motion sought centralization of 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. (footnote and citation omitted).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. II), 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2014).  
 51. See id. at 1355–56.  
 52. See id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. In re Plavix Prods. Liab. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 
2011). In this instance, the plaintiffs opposed centralization. Id.  
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ten actions pending in the District of New Jersey and single actions 
pending in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.55 In a 
brief order, the Panel summarized its reasoning: “The limited 
number of actions and relatively few involved counsel . . . weigh 
against centralization. The District of New Jersey plaintiffs are all 
represented by the same law firms, and plaintiffs in [the New York 
districts] also share counsel.”56 In February 2013, however, the Panel 
ordered transfer of some but not all pending actions to the District of 
New Jersey, citing “a significant change in circumstances.”57 Among 
the changing circumstances the Panel cited were an increase in the 
number of related actions, such that actions were pending in a total of 
14 districts;58 an increase in the volume of related state-court 
actions, signaling a potential increase in federal cases;59 and that 
“the number of law firms in the litigation also has increased 
significantly . . . . In the present docket, there are not only more 
involved actions but also significantly more involved counsel.”60  
It is interesting to note that Pfizer, in its brief opposing 
centralization the second time in the Lipitor litigation, argued in 
part that centralization would “lead to the filing of a large number 
of ‘non-viable’ cases (e.g., cases in which the subject plaintiffs 
already had diabetes before they began taking Lipitor).”61 These 
issues may be most acute for potential plaintiffs with claims based 
on injuries that are not substance specific, like many kinds of 
cancer or (as in Lipitor) diabetes.62 In other words, formal 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. at 1379.  
 56. Id. at 1378 (footnote omitted). 
 57. In re Plavix Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 923 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 
(J.P.M.L. 2013). Again, the plaintiffs opposed centralization. See id. at 1377. 
The Panel denied, without prejudice, transfer of twelve actions in two districts in 
which motions to remand to state court were pending. See id. at 1380.  
 58. See id.  
 59. See id. On this point, the existence of a large number of potential tag-
alongs was key: “The Miller Firm, which represents plaintiffs in a number of the 
constituent actions in this docket, states that it represents plaintiffs in ‘hundreds’ 
of cases filed in California and Illinois, and defendants assert that the total 
number of state cases exceeds 2,000. This dramatic increase . . . suggests that 
the number of related federal actions will increase as well.” Id. at 1378. 
 60. Id. at 1379. Again, the presence of “unique law firm[s] (i.e., [firms] that 
[appear] in no other related action)” indicates that informal coordination of 
pretrial proceedings may not be adequate. Id. at 1379. 
 61. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prod. 
Liab. Litig. (No. II), 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1355–56 (J.P.M.L. 2014). 
 62. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC 
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 9 (1986) (“[T]he pathways of causation are difficult 
to detect, the time periods extend over decades, and the effects are not readily 
isolated or scientifically understood. In some cases the victims may not even 
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aggregation of the Lipitor litigation would increase the claiming 
rate in the overall litigation.63 There are clearly incentives for 
attorneys in some circumstances to seek MDL centralization as a 
strategy. In some instances, parties attempt to manufacture 
multidistrict aggregation by filing a similar case in a second 
district. As the Panel noted in one such instance: “It is only the 
existence of the moving party’s newly-filed action in District Y 
that gives the litigation its multidistrict character.”64 In another 
instance, involving an airplane crash in Pakistan, the defendants 
moved to consolidate two actions, one pending in the Central 
District of California, the other in the Northern District of 
Alabama.65 The Panel noted that “if plaintiff in the Northern 
District of Alabama action had not filed his claims in both districts, 
the multidistrict character of this litigation would not exist.”66  
Remands to state court were also a more common outcome for 
the non-centralized cases than for civil cases in general: 6% 
compared to 3%, respectively. Non-centralized cases were also 
more likely to terminate by “statistical closing” than civil cases in 
general, 6% to 3%.67 This finding suggests that some non-
centralized cases were placeholders filed to manufacture a multidistrict 
                                                                                                             
 
know that they have been harmed or that their harm is associated with a 
particular agent.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and 
Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE. J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 179, 189 (2001). “Aggregation may also lead to higher claiming 
rates, meaning that larger numbers of plaintiffs come forward to obtain 
compensation.” Id. (footnote omitted). In some circumstances, either the quality 
of the additional plaintiffs’ claims, or the value of their claims, would be too 
small to be brought as individual actions. See id. at 198 (discussing cases in 
which “losses were comparatively small, [so that] securing individual legal 
representation on a contingency-fee basis would have been more problematic 
unless plaintiff attorneys were prepared to pursue individual claims in a mass, 
but non-class, litigation”).  
 64. In re Transocean Ltd. Sec. Litig. (No. II), 753 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1375 
(J.P.M.L. 2010). The Panel order described the facts in the Transocean motion 
as “curious,” and noted that there were contentions from parties opposing 
centralization that “the real reason [the movant] is now seeking centralization in 
the Southern District of Texas is that under Second Circuit law, [the movant] is 
not eligible for appointment as lead plaintiff.” Id. at 1374 n.2.  
 65. In re Air Crash Near Islamabad, Pakistan, on July 28, 2010, 777 F. 
Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2011).  
 66. Id.  
 67. Statistical closing is an administrative procedure used to close cases, 
and thus to eliminate cases from a court’s statistical reports, when the docket is 
inactive and no further proceedings are contemplated. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE 29 (Version 1.1, Mar. 
2010).  
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litigation out of a single action, as discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. Interestingly, non-centralized cases were not more likely to 
settle than civil cases in general. The “settlement” disposition accounts 
for 22% of cases in both categories. The “voluntary dismissal” 
category often includes settlements, as well. Combining these 
categories yields a settlement rate of 36% for non-centralized cases 
and 34% for civil cases in general.  
A very low percentage of non-centralized cases go to trial (less 
than 1%), but this is true of civil cases in general (1%). The dockets of 
all the non-centralized trial cases were examined using PACER. 
Although the “Trial” column in Figure 2 represents 19 case 
dispositions, further research found only 12 actual trials, mostly 
because of intra-district consolidation of non-centralized but related 
cases. It is probably not wise to generalize about 12 cases, but as with 
trial cases in general, these were unusual cases. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Actavis Elizabeth L.L.C.,68 for example, plaintiff pharmaceutical 
manufacturer sued another pharmaceutical manufacturer for patent 
infringement in the District of New Jersey. There was a related case in 
the Eastern District of Virginia, providing for the multidistrict nature 
and giving rise to the plaintiff’s motion to transfer69—but the Eastern 
District case was dismissed, mooting the motion.70 After more than 
five years of litigation—the docket runs to 760 entries, including 
several additional defendants and an appeal to the Federal Circuit—
and a six-day bench trial, the court entered a final judgment in January 
2013, awarding plaintiff with just $57,488.73 in costs.71 From the 
perspective of costs, both parties probably would have been better off 
settling, but it seems unlikely that the parties were interested in 
settlement. But at least the plaintiffs in the Atomoxetine Patent 
Litigation were awarded something. Perhaps the most unusual trial 
case we examined was Mooney v. Allianz Life Ins. Co.,72 a class 
action fraud action against a seller of deferred annuities. The Panel 
denied transfer of overlapping class actions that had reached “a 
significantly advanced stage,” with certified classes in “four actions, 
and fact discovery . . . completed (or . . . nearing completion) in three 
                                                                                                             
 68. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth L.L.C., 676 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D.N.J. 
2011).  
 69. See Eli Lilly, No. 07-cv-3770 (DMC) (D.N.J filed Dec. 14, 2007). 
 70. Pleading No. 17 at 1, In re Atomoxetine Patent Litig., MDL No. 1924, 
No. 2:07-45 (J.P.M.L. Mar. 18, 2008) (“The Panel has now been advised that the 
listed Eastern District of Virginia action was dismissed.”).  
 71. Clerk’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to 
Tax Costs, Eli Lilly, 676 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2013).  
 72. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Mooney v. Allianz 
Life Ins. Co., 244 F.R.D. 531 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2006) (No. 0:06-545). 
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of them.”73 One of these certified class actions was tried before a jury 
in the District of Minnesota. The jury found that the defendant had 
engaged in fraud “but none of the Plaintiffs were harmed as a direct 
result of the misrepresentation or deceptive practice. No damages were 
awarded.”74 This is a rare find, indeed: a certified consumer class 
action that went to trial, combined with a plaintiff’s verdict without 
damages.  
IV. TERMINATION OF CENTRALIZED CASES 
The Panel Cases Database provides very limited information on 
the nature of centralized case termination in MDL proceedings. The 
most common code is “Closed,” appearing in 261,729 of the 339,480 
cases with termination information (77%).75 This code does not 
indicate the reason that the MDL cases were terminated in the 
transferee district—i.e., whether the MDL cases were closed as the 
result of a global settlement, some other form of settlement, a ruling on 
a dispositive motion, a trial verdict, or simply based on a voluntary 
dismissal without settlement. Moreover, because these cases have 
different docket numbers in the transferor and transferee courts, the 
matching technique that was used to identify the non-centralized cases 
generally will not work with centralized cases.  
TABLE 1: TERMINATION CODES FOR MDL CASES, 1992–AUGUST 
2013 (SOURCE: PANEL CASES DATABASE) (N=339,480) 
Termination 
Code 
Asbestos 
[MDL 875] 
All Other 
Products Liability 
Non-Products 
Liability 
Closed 71% 85% 70% 
CRO/Remand 
Final 
1% 6% 3% 
State Court 2% 7% 5% 
Admin. Closed 25% 0% 3% 
N 163,267 150,793 25,420 
 
Table 1 summarizes the disposition codes for terminated MDL 
cases, breaking out the asbestos cases, all other products liability 
cases, and all non-products liability proceedings as separate 
columns. As Table 1 makes very clear, 71% of asbestos cases that 
                                                                                                             
 73. In re Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. Deferred Annuity Mktg. & Sales 
Practices Litig., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (2007).  
 74. Jury Verdict, In re Allianz, 244 F.R.D. 531 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2009).  
 75. 80% of the cases in the database had terminated as of August 2013. 
There were 87,360 pending MDL cases as of that date.  
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have terminated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were coded 
as “Closed” in the database, and another 25% were coded as 
“Administratively Closed.”76 Together, these two codes account 
for 96% of all asbestos terminations. One percent of asbestos 
cases—a total of 760 cases over the course of the proceeding—
were remanded to transferor courts, and 2% were remanded to 
state court.77  
The pattern for non-asbestos products liability cases is 
different. “Closed” is still the most common code—occurring in 
85% of the terminated MDL cases—but very few of these cases 
were administratively closed (rounds to zero). However, a much 
larger proportion of non-asbestos products liability cases were 
remanded to the transferor court—6% of all MDL terminations—
and a much larger proportion were remanded to state court—7%. It 
would be overly hasty to conclude, however, that remands to 
transferor courts are widely distributed among non-asbestos MDL 
proceedings. Remands to the transferor court were concentrated in 
just five MDL proceedings: 59% of remands were in MDL No. 
926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability 
Litigation); 14% were in MDL No. 1014 (In re Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Products Liability Litigation); 6% in MDL No. 1148 (In re 
Latex Gloves Products Liability Litigation); 6% in MDL No. 1407 
(In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation); 
and 4% in MDL No. 1507 (In re Prempro Products Liability). 
These five MDL proceedings account for 89% of all section 1407 
remands in non-asbestos products liability proceedings. Outside of 
these proceedings, remand to the transferor court for further 
proceedings has been a very uncommon occurrence. The same is 
true for remands to state court; 76% of all remands to state court in 
non-asbestos products liability cases were in just two proceedings: 
50% in MDL No. 1535 (In re Welding Fume Products Liability 
Litigation), and 26% in MDL No. 926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants Products Liability Litigation). 
                                                                                                             
 76. Moreover, 98% of the asbestos cases in the database had terminated as 
of the last update. Few cases now remain in this MDL proceeding. This is a 
remarkable development, given the history of this litigation. See generally 
Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm? 23 WIDENER L.J. 97 
(2013) (documenting history and new developments in the asbestos multidistrict 
proceeding, authored by current transferee judge).  
 77. Transferee judges have the power to rule on section 1447 remand 
motions in transferred cases. See, e.g., J.P.M.L & FED. JUD. CTR., TEN STEPS TO 
BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
TRANSFEREE JUDGES 5 (2009).  
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In the non-products liability cases, closure in the transferee 
court is still the most common termination code, at 70%. Three 
percent of non-products liability cases are remanded to the 
transferor court, and 5% are remanded to state court.78  
In short, in most MDL proceedings, few, if any, cases 
terminate other than by closure in the transferee court. Further 
research is needed to identify exactly how these cases terminate in 
the transferee court—by global settlement or other means.  
V. SECTION 1407 REMANDS, 2000–2013 
As discussed in the preceding section, section 1407 remands to 
the transferor court are relatively uncommon; most centralized 
cases are resolved in the transferee court, with or without a global 
settlement.79 This section analyzes the 2,361 section 1407 remand 
cases that were identified in the 2000–2013 database, a subset of 
the cases in the prior section on which more complete information 
was found. These cases were found in 127 MDL proceedings—i.e., 
in most proceedings, there are no remands to the transferor court. 
Even in the MDL proceedings with section 1407 remands, remands 
were not terribly common. The modal number of remands in these 
127 proceedings is one (52 of the proceedings had a single 
remand). Table 2 lists the MDL proceedings with the most section 
1407 remand cases. The most section 1407 remands in this period, 
20%, were in MDL No. 1407 (In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 
Products Liability Litigation). Not surprisingly, 17% of all the 
remands in the database were in MDL No. 875 (In re Asbestos 
Products Liability Litigation (VI)). Given that this is the largest 
MDL proceeding of all time, this makes a great deal of sense. The 
asbestos MDL proceeding is followed by several other large 
products liability MDL proceedings: MDL No. 1507 (In re 
Prempro Products Liability Litigation), 15% of remands; MDL No. 
1148 (In re Latex Gloves Products Liability Litigation), 9%; MDL 
1203 (In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) 
Products Liability Litigation), 5%; MDL No. 1760 (In re Aredia and 
                                                                                                             
 78. In the non-products liability cases, moreover, the remands are more 
widely distributed among proceedings. No single non-products liability 
proceeding accounts for more than 15 % of remands to state court, and no single 
proceeding accounts for more than 21 % of remands to the transferor courts. 
 79. See also Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge 
Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
19 ME. B.J. 16, 21 (2004) (“At that point, the litigation, like all cases for that 
matter, tends to settle or is resolved by summary judgment rulings by the transferee 
judge, so remand for trial is unnecessary. The cases go away through settlement or 
some other thing. It is only occasionally that cases are remanded . . . .”).  
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Zometa Products Liability Litigation), 5%; MDL No. 1373 (In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation), 4%; 
and MDL No. 2016 (In re Yamaha Motor Corp. Rhino ATV Products 
Liability Litigation), 2%. These eight large proceedings account for 
75% of all section 1407 remands during this period.80 Section 1407 
remand cases were also identified in 119 additional proceedings, 
accounting for another quarter of remands. Eighty-nine percent of the 
section 1407 remand cases are products liability cases, which is 
consistent with the percentage of all centralized cases that are 
products liability. 
  
                                                                                                             
 80. It is interesting to note that several of the proceedings with the highest 
numbers of section 1407 remands were also proceedings in which there was a de 
facto global settlement rather than a court-approved global settlement. 
Presumably, the critical issues in these proceedings were decided in the 
transferee court, with the plaintiff attorneys and defendants agreeing on a 
framework to begin settling cases, either individually or in groups. Some of 
these settlements would have occurred before remand to the transferor court, but 
others may have occurred after. In PPA, there was evidence that settlement was 
piecemeal, yet added up to be more or less global, with remanded cases adding 
their pieces. There was no global settlement, although there was a class 
settlement relating to Dexatrim, one of the products containing PPA. See In re 
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:01-md-01407 (W.D. 
Wash. May 10, 2013) (Chattem, Inc.’s, Motion to Enforce Settlement/Judgment 
and to Enjoin). Yet the court noted “the considerable success achieved for 
plaintiffs in this litigation,” including “settlements exceed[ing] $307,500,000,” 
in awarding $15.5 million in fees to attorneys who performed work that 
benefitted all plaintiffs. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2:01-md-01407 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2009) (order granting 
common benefit fee committee’s petition and directing payment of fees earned 
by attorneys performing common benefit work). The court determined that the 
PPA litigation, centralized in 2001, had matured by the end of 2003 and set forth 
a procedure for any party’s attorney to petition for a suggestion of remand order. 
See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:01-md-01407 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2003) (case management order no. 17 remand of cases). 
Because other parties could object to remand, the procedure seems designed to 
expedite remand of cases when the parties were in agreement, and thus perhaps 
in the process of settling.  
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TABLE 2: MDL PROCEEDINGS WITH MOST SECTION 1407 
REMANDS, 2000–2013  
Proceeding Number of section 1407 Remands 
Percentage of section 
1407 Remands 
MDL No. 1407 479 20% 
MDL No. 875 399 17% 
MDL No. 1507 356 15% 
MDL No. 1148 204 9% 
MDL No. 1203 111 5% 
MDL No. 1760 107 5% 
MDL No. 1373 86 4% 
MDL No. 2016 39 2% 
119 additional 
proceedings 580 25% 
 
Studying the ultimate disposition of the section 1407 remand 
cases proved to be quite challenging. The textbook section 1407 
remand case should have at least two records in the transferor 
court.81 First, the case will close in the transferor court when 
transferred to the transferee court. Second, after remand it will 
reopen, thus creating a new record, and then close in the transferor 
court again at some point.82 It is not uncommon, however, for cases 
to have more than two records in the transferor court in the courts’ 
civil Integrated Data Base (IDB), signaling that, for some reason, the 
district court closed the case and then re-opened it at least one 
additional time—either before or after the section 1407 transfer and 
remand sequence. To address this issue, the disposition code for the 
last record for a case not coded “statistical close” was treated as 
definitive. In the event that the only post-remand record was coded 
“statistical close,” that code was assigned.  
Two other sets of cases proved to be even more problematic. 
Some section 1407 remand cases from the Cases Database do not 
match to the IDB at all—a general issue discussed briefly in the 
Technical Appendix. Another set of section 1407 remand cases only 
had a single record in the IDB; i.e., they deviate from the textbook 
model described in the preceding section. In some of these cases, the 
                                                                                                             
 81. In the IDB, a new case record is typically generated whenever a case is 
reopened. For example, a case that is closed with the granting of summary 
judgment in the district court and then re-opened with an appellate remand 
reversing that judgment would appear in the IDB two times.  
 82. Because cases are typically assigned a new docket number in the 
transferee court, it is not feasible to match case records in the transferor and 
transferee courts. 
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single record represented the pre- and post-centralization case in one 
record. It appears that, in a small subset of MDL cases, the 
transferor court does not actually close the record at the time of the 
section 1407 transfer; if these cases are subsequently remanded, 
there is no second record, but the new disposition information is 
assigned when the remanded case closes in the transferor court 
(technically, for a second time). In a second subset of the single-
record cases, the remanded case appears to have been assigned a 
new docket number in the transferor court and thus cannot be 
matched to the corresponding pre-transfer case record. This need not 
be “error” on the part of the transferor court. Some of these remand 
cases are, technically, “new” cases, created in the transferee court 
through the transferee severed procedure described above.83 In 
Figure 4, all cases were included, including single-record cases, with 
non-transfer dispositions, that match to the IDB.  
As can be seen in Figure 4, the most common disposition for a 
section 1407 remand case back in the transferor court is settlement, 
which accounts for half of all records (50%). Other dismissal (18%) 
and voluntary dismissal (15%) account for another third of the 
records. Because many, and probably most, of these dispositions are 
also the result of a settlement, it is likely safe to conclude that more 
than eight in ten section 1407 remand cases terminate with a 
settlement in the transferor court. This is an interesting finding—
settlement in the transferee court is hardly an unusual occurrence, 
after all. But for some reason, these cases were settled only after 
remand. It is likely that, in some of these cases, the settlement after 
remand is an individual settlement removed from a more 
comprehensive settlement, if any, in the transferee court. It is also 
likely that, in some of these cases, the settlement reached in the 
transferor court was related to a more comprehensive settlement in 
the transferee court.  
  
                                                                                                             
 83. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 4: DISPOSITIONS FOR REMAND CASES (N=1,608), 
2000–2013 
It is also interesting that 5% of section 1407 remand cases were 
resolved on a pretrial motion in the transferor court, most likely on 
summary judgment. As in the trial cases, section 1407 remand does 
not necessarily mean that all issues related to an individual plaintiff’s 
claims have been resolved in the transferee court. It only means that 
the issues common to the centralized MDL cases have been 
resolved.84 In a relatively small percentage of section 1407 remand 
cases, then, defendants prevail on a motion for summary judgment 
relating to an individual plaintiff’s claims. Many, if not most, of the 
summary judgment cases probably turn on issues of individual 
causation. In a products liability action, for example, an order in the 
MDL proceeding establishing general causation does not relieve 
individual plaintiffs of making a showing of specific causation after a 
section 1407 remand.85 Individual causation appears to be a common 
                                                                                                             
 84. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.  
 85. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion 
to Modify/Discharge/Declare not Applicable Protective Order Issued in MDL 
Action, Nelson v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 3:09-2904, 2012 WL 1380259 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) (granting summary judgment to defendants because 
plaintiff was unable to provide admissible expert testimony on specific 
causation); c.f. Order, Meade v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:09-1833, 2011 WL 
4402539 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2011) (granting summary judgment because 
plaintiff’s expert witnesses’ testimony was insufficient to establish a design 
defect, despite recall). Summary judgment on the basis of missing expert 
evidence is not limited to the products liability cases, however. See, e.g., 
Memorandum and Order, Sciallo et al. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., No. 1:03-7770, 2012 
WL 2861340 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012) (granting summary judgment in a 
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issue in asbestos section 1407 remand cases, given the difficulty that 
many plaintiffs have providing evidence that the plaintiff’s injuries 
were proximately caused by any particular defendant’s asbestos-
containing products.86 But summary judgment can be granted on other 
grounds, as well. In a few cases, summary judgment was granted to 
defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds in the transferor court—
even if the cases had been part of an MDL proceeding for several 
years.87 
Relatedly, the surprisingly low trial rate for the section 1407 
remand cases—only 2%, representing 27 jury verdicts, two bench 
trials, and one directed verdict—must be considered in light of the 
distinction between individual and common issues in a centralized 
MDL proceeding. The MDL transferee court will suggest remand 
when it has completed common pretrial proceedings, but that does not 
necessarily mean that the constituent cases are “ready for trial.” There 
may in fact be a great deal of individual discovery remaining in a 
section 1407 remand case. Moreover, the settlement rate must be 
considered in relation to the trial rate. To the extent that the parties face 
further discovery costs in the section 1407 remand cases, this may 
provide an incentive to settle back in the transferor court. To the extent 
that there is a “firm” trial date, the parties may also have powerful 
incentives to settle.  
The trial rate for section 1407 remand cases is similar to the trial 
rate for civil cases in general. On this point, there is a bit of historical 
irony. When the Judicial Conference proposed the creation of the 
multidistrict litigation procedure in the 1960s, some critics of the 
proposal argued that it could create injustice to have one judge manage 
the pretrial proceedings and a different judge, much less familiar with 
the issues than the transferee judge, preside at trial in the same case.88 
                                                                                                             
 
securities fraud action because plaintiffs had failed to timely file expert evidence 
to support loss causation).  
 86. Wannall v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2013) (plaintiff 
was unable to show that exposure to defendant’s asbestos-containing products 
was sufficient cause of decedent’s mesothelioma, given multiple exposures).  
 87. See, e.g., Bryant v. Wyeth, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D. Miss. 2011) 
(granting summary judgment in a products liability action on statute-of-
limitations ground, after case had been in transferee court several years); 
Memorandum, Opinion, and Order, Linton v. Wyeth Inc., No. 1:04-705, 2012 
WL 5303850 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2012); see also Order, Dvorak v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., No. 0:97-cv-7018 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2001) (granting summary 
judgment in a sales practices action based on Florida’s statute of limitations for 
fraud claims).  
 88. See, e.g., A Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation of Multidistrict 
Litigation: Hearing on H.R. 8276 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery, 89th Cong. 89 (1966) (letter from Hon. Emanuel Celler) 
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This does not appear to have been an actual problem in the 
overwhelming majority of section 1407 remand cases, which 
themselves represent only a very small percentage of all centralized 
MDL cases.89  
The 30 trials—and again, mostly jury verdicts—represented in 
Figure 3 took place in nine proceedings. So out of the 127 proceedings 
with section 1407 remand cases, a trial disposition could not be located 
in 118, or 93%. In other words, most MDL proceedings do not 
produce section 1407 remands, and even the MDL proceedings that 
produce them do not appear to result in individual trials. The MDL 
proceedings in which the trial dispositions were located are listed in 
Table 3. There were seven trials on remand in MDL No. 1507 (In re 
Prempro Products Liability Litigation) and MDL No. 1760 (In re 
Aredia and Zometa Products Liability Litigation), and six in MDL No. 
1373 (In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Products Liability Litigation). 
We also identified three trials each in MDL No. 875 (In re Asbestos 
Products Liability Litigation) and MDL No. 1203 (In re Diet Drugs 
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine Products Liability 
Litigation). These are all large MDL proceedings, accounting for large 
numbers of remands during our study period, so it makes sense that 
most of the trial dispositions occurred in these cases. 
TABLE 3: TRIALS IN SECTION 1407 REMAND CASES, 2000–2013 
Proceeding Number of trials 
MDL No. 1507 7 
MDL No. 1760 7 
MDL No. 1373 6 
MDL No. 875 3 
MDL No. 1203 3 
MDL No. 1061 1 
MDL No. 1132 1 
MDL No. 1148 1 
MDL No. 1721 1 
Total 30 
                                                                                                             
 
(“It follows that if a case is pretried in a distant forum by other parties in other 
cases under the procedures followed by a different court injustice may well 
result.”).  
 89. Remand to the transferor district does not necessarily mean that a 
different judge will try the case, even in the event of a trial. The transferee judge 
may seek an interdistrict assignment for purposes of trying a remanded case in 
the transferor district. See ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, supra note 14, at 5. 
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During the Symposium discussion in March, Professor 
McGovern suggested that some asbestos trials were likely missing. 
Given the difficulties matching some of the section 1407 remand 
records to the IDB, we have no doubt that this is probably true. 
Further analysis of the IDB indicates 21 asbestos products liability 
cases terminating by trial in districts other than the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania since 2000; some of these cases are likely section 
1407 remand cases that we cannot match to the Cases Database.  
CONCLUSION 
When the organizers of this Symposium asked us if we were 
interested in writing something on the subject of “Disaggregation” 
in the context of multidistrict litigation, it did not take us long to 
focus on these two categories of cases—those cases that are part of 
a transfer motion that is not granted, and those cases that are 
transferred but then subsequently remanded to the transferor court. 
In a very real sense, these cases are at the margins of the MDL 
process. Most cases are centralized, especially if one factors in the 
large numbers of tag-along cases in some products liability 
proceedings. And few centralized cases are remanded to the 
transferor court, and even post-remand, the most likely outcome 
for an MDL case is settlement.  
This raises the question: What role does remand play in 
contemporary multidistrict litigation? Perhaps the potential for 
remand is best understood as a tool to assist the transferee judge in 
focusing the parties on global resolution. Plaintiffs may disfavor 
disaggregation because they will lose the concentrated pressure on 
defendants of hundreds or thousands of cases.90 On the other hand, 
defendants may fear remand because it creates the potential for 
multiple trials, each one a gamble that may result in a huge 
judgment.91  
The Panel has in recent years made clear that remand is not a 
failed outcome in MDL proceedings. Once efficiencies in pretrial 
proceedings have been exploited, it is appropriate to return the 
cases to their transferor districts. By statute, one of the goals of the 
MDL process is to create efficiencies in the judicial system. By 
having one judge working through several similar cases in a single 
proceeding, instead of multiple judges working on individual cases 
across the country, judicial time and resources are saved. The 
Panel frequently cites efficiency as a reason for centralizing cases 
                                                                                                             
 90. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 
667, 693–94 (2013) [hereinafter Burch, Disaggregating].  
 91. See id. 
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in a proceeding.92 Commentators have expressed concern about 
remand because transferor judges may lack the expertise in the 
subject matter of the litigation that transferee judges have 
accumulated during the proceedings.93 Nonetheless, we find these 
cases to be similar to all other civil litigation in how they 
terminate: relatively few go to trial. Given a goal of efficiency, it is 
hardly surprising that centralization is so often the Panel’s 
decision, and that substantially many more cases are centralized 
than denied.94 Although centralization is frequent, it is hardly a 
definite outcome, and attorneys who attempt to manufacture 
litigation in multiple districts see the Panel call out their actions 
and deny centralization.95 Of course, if it is later determined that 
there are legitimate reasons for centralization, the Panel is willing 
to revisit its decision as seen in the Plavix and Lipitor litigations.96 
Moreover, if efficiency is a goal—and it seems fair to say that it 
is—the rarity of remanding cases should not be surprising either. 
Remand is a tool transferee judges can use to manage litigation, 
but it is rarely necessary, even in the most complex of MDLs such 
as Asbestos and PPA. In a world of aggregate litigation, there is 
relatively little disaggregation once constituent cases are combined 
through centralization. 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
To examine the nature of disaggregate litigation, we relied on 
two databases. The first database, called the Panel Cases Database, 
was compiled from data provided by the Panel in August of 2013. 
The data reports the case number, district of filing, potential MDL 
proceeding number and type of proceeding, as well as the Panel’s 
decision regarding centralization, the date of the decision, and the 
action taken by the Panel with respect to the case (e.g., CTO, 
                                                                                                             
 92. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); Margaret S. Williams and Tracey E. 
George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to Transfer 
and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424 
(2013); Burch, Unsettling Efficiency, supra note 3, at 195–96.  
 93. Burch, Diasggregating, supra note 90, at 696.  
 94. Emery G. Lee III, Catherine Borden, Margaret S. Williams, and Kevin 
M. Scott, Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, (Fed. Judicial 
Ctr., working paper) (on file with authors). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Transocean Ltd. Sec. Litig. (No. II), 753 F. Supp. 2d 
1373, 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2010); In re Air Crash Near Islamabad, Pakistan, on July 
28, 2010, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2011). 
 96. In re Plavix Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 923 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 
(J.P.M.L. 2013); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), MDL No. 2502, 2014 WL 661589 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 18, 
2014).  
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NTN). The Panel’s data include a wide array of cases, but are only 
complete since about 1992 when the Panel began to automate its 
records.  
The data from the Panel were merged with the IDB maintained 
by the Federal Judicial Center and available from ICPSR. This data 
includes case information including filing and termination dates 
and districts, nature of suit code, case disposition, as well as other 
information such as trial date (if any). The most recent version of 
the civil IDB contains records for all cases filed (or terminated) 
since 2000. For this reason, our analysis of matched cases is 
generally limited to the period from 2000 to 2013; our analysis of 
the Cases Database generally extends to 1992.  
The data from the IDB were matched to the Panel’s data using 
an SQL merge to join the two databases, matching on district and 
case number. The merge allowed us to include all the Panel 
cases—those that did match to a case in the IDB as well as those 
that did not. There were 338,737 cases in the merged dataset, 
12,397 of which did not match to the IDB. Many of the unmatched 
cases were in older MDL proceedings, leading us to believe that 
the Panel’s case number was not the original case number, making 
it impossible to match. With the data merged, we then removed 
any duplicate cases from the database. Although the duplicate 
cases had the same case number, they often had different filing 
dates. Generally speaking, we wanted the last record in the 
sequence of filing dates, assuming the last record did not have a 
disposition code of statistical close (a disposition code frequently 
used for record keeping purposes, after all substantive matters in 
the case are resolved). There were a few cases where every 
disposition code in the sequence of cases was statistical close, and 
so we simply took the last case in the sequence, consistent with our 
other coding decisions. After removing all duplicate cases, we 
were left with 315,516 cases, 96% of which had a match with a 
case in the IDB. It is on these cases that we conducted our analysis. 
 
